USPEnergies
Our passion is to provide the complete range of process engineering services to the hydrocarbon industry, including; – Process Simulation~~~Process Design~~~Process Engineering~~~Process Safety and Loss Prevention
Promax is capable of modelling existing and new units, with generic (MDEA, MEA, DEA, DGEA) or proprietary solvents (Jefftreat, Ucarsol) etc
Bench mark the key process parameters with industry best practices
Trouble-shoot any operational constraints
Optimize utilities
Adapt to changing feed composition
Adapt operational to changes in product specifications
Remember: The SIL (Safety Integrity Level) is applicable to all the components and sub-components of the SIF. This means that the SIF devices need to be independent from the BPCS in order to avoid common cause failure and also reduce both CAPEX and OPEX resulting from higher reliability, testing, and inspection required for a SIF.
Transmitters and detectors which will initiate the remedial action in the event of design parameter exceedance. The Transmitter is usually an independent device from the device which has a process control action.
A programmable device which will typically take an action to close, open, start or trip the final element. It is usually a PLC which is independent from the DCS / BPCS. This is a good practice in order to avoid common cause failure.
The Final Element will bring the process to a safe position and stop the sequence of hazardous events from further escalating. The Final element may comprise of sub-components such as solenoid valves, actuators, relays and contactors.
While Process Safety identifies High severity-High probability hazard scenarios, Functional Safety ensures their mitigation to ALARP, through implementation of control systems ( SIFs-Safety Instrumented Functions, in FS parlance). In compliance with IEC 61508, we undertake the Analysis phase, prepare the SRS of the SIF (design phase) and provide support during the operation and maintenance phases. We take pride in excellence in both the domains, having undertaken several key assignments over the years.
HAZID, HAZOP facilitation, Technical scribing, recording and reporting
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) (semi-quantitative method)Risk Graph (qualitative method)
SRS are a key document giving the key parameters such as useful-life, Proof-test-interval, mean-time-to-repair etc which are used to perform the SIL verification calculations.
- Random Failure (PFDavg)
- Architectural Constraints (HFT)
- Systematic Capability (certification)
FSP certificate from EXIDA for SIL Verification using ExSILentia (FSE244)
INTRODUCTION
'That’s what PHA’s are supposed to do!' The above quote from Ron Smith describes aptly what a PHA is supposed to do. PHA's are an important pillar of a robust PSM program. The need for process safety expertise is ever increasing and a growing challenge in the hydrocarbon, petrochemicals and chemicals industry across the globe. Knowledge and expertise in hazards identification is essential in reducing risk to “As Low As Reasonably Practical“ (ALARP), for existing installations or new projects . A good and thorough Hazop study is vital for effective risk identification and mitigation. Organizations can ensure good Hazop quality by developing Hazop skills of their engineers.
HAZOP training is provided by Umesh Goel, an expert trainer with long years of experience, utilizing a practical and interactive approach. The session includes several work-shops and mock Hazops, thus giving the candidates invaluable hands-on-experience to the trainees.
KEY OBJECTIVES
- To effectively prepare and conduct Hazop sessions (review team, methodology, documentation and implementation).
- To participate proactively in the Hazop sessions, applying methodologies in a conscientious and rigorous manner while encouraging out-of the box thinking.
- To carry out a qualitative risk assessment, identify high severity scenarios, check the adequacy of existing safeguards and give recommendations for additional safeguards.
Dense loading of the catalyst allows 20-25% of additional catalyst loading in the existing reactor space, thus improving the performance of the unit significantly. Dense loading leads to lower catalyst attrition as well as a more uniformly distributed bed compared to a conventional sock loading technique.
We provide expert supervision of catalyst dense loading as an independent third party agency, thus ensuring a homogeneous, uniform and flat bed of catalyst with an optimum bulk density. This will result in longer life cycle and improved performance in terms of higher yields and lower severity.
The results are presented in the form of a report giving the 'Actual Loading Data' such as bed heights, tons of catalyst loaded and relative distances to internals (distributors, collectors etc)
Promax - the leading steady state simulator from Bryan Research and Engineering, USA. BR&E and USP Energy Division jointly organize several training sessions each year in India, in different cities across the length and breadth of the country. You are welcome to join our next training session. Please go to the link below for the details pertaining to the dates and venue of the next Promax training session.
The Formula-1 crash on 29th Nov 2020 at the Bahrain Grand Prix, Sakhir circuit, has striking similarities to a process safety incident. The crash itself was horrific too watch and one of the most dramatic incidents seen in recent times. The fireball which engulfed the car after the crash was so intense that the driver could not be seen for almost 30 seconds till he emerged from the inferno. It reminded of the Fire which followed a natural gas pipeline explosion, which resulted in fatalities a few years ago.
The incident can be classified as a near-miss a process safety parlance. It demonstrates that hazardous incidents will happen, and that adequate safety measures will save lives. Mitigating the consequences to ALARP can be achieved by deploying adequate safeguards.
The crash can be classified as a Loss-of-Containment scenario in Process Safety parlance. The car (equipment) which was driven by a trained driver (operator) hit the wall at a high speed (design parameters exceedance) and resulted in the rupture of fuel tank leading to release of flammable hydrocarbons, ignition and fire hazard. This is a classic process safety incident and can be analyzed with LOPA technique in terms of adequacy of safeguards/protection layers.
A thorough and in-depth analysis of the near-miss incidents is vital to reinforce the safeguards. Questions must be asked if the fuel tank could have been fabricated to avoid rupture. Could the collision avoidance system be deployed in the cars with-in the frame work of sporting norms. Could there be air-bags or even an eject button available to the driver. Could there be fire hydrants and fire monitors to cover the track in case of an emergency.....so on and so forth.
The process industry must borrow from the Formula-1 experience and be open, and not be shackled by what has been the norm over the years. Questions must be asked even if they are off the beaten path.
The Cars safety features worked like magic, the halo saved the driver from serious injury or fatality. Though much resistance was there to install the Halo in the first instance, it's deployment proved to be a key safeguard.
Similarly, in the process safety industry, we must be able to deploy the protection layers which work-on-demand. The reliability of the all the safety equipments must be ensured. Further, new ideas must be heard with an open mind and implemented, even if the consensus is sometimes otherwise.
They can make the difference between life and death. Their training is vital for safe operations, the good doctor along with the fire extinguisher crew was on the crash site with-in seconds and was able to help the driver to jump over the railing to safety.